フィラデルフィアの地元紙のコラムより
米国で根強い「原爆が日本降伏につながった論」への反論。http://www.phillyburbs.com/blogs/news_columnists/jerry-jonas/did-we-really-have-to-drop-those-atomic-bombs/article_566d4772-4ee4-58d6-909d-b7731fcab84b.html
Over the decades, there has been a continuing argument over whether the use of those atomic bombs — especially against civilian populations — was justified, and whether they had actually caused Japan to surrender.
Most American veterans of World War II insist that the bomb was necessary and that it may have saved their lives by eliminating the need to invade Japan — an operation that would certainly have resulted in hundreds of thousands of American deaths.
何十年にもわたって、原爆の投下、特に一般市民への投下に対する正当性や実際日本の降伏につながったかどうかについて議論が続いている。第二次大戦経験者の多くは、原爆が必要であり何十万もの兵士の命が日本侵攻の過程で失われるのを阻止したという。
本当に日本への上陸作戦が必要と考えられていたのか？原爆投下が日本の降伏に必須だと、当時の指導者は考えていたのか？
In his memoirs, Gen. (and later President) Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote: “In July, 1945, Secretary of War (Henry L.) Stimson informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated, and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum ‘loss of face.’ ”
According to numerous sources, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the highest-ranking Army officer in the Pacific, was equally dubious over the use of the bomb.
Norman Cousins, one of MacArthur’s chief consultants during the American occupation of Japan, recorded several of his many conversations with the general.
“MacArthur’s views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the public supposed.” Cousins wrote. “When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, he replied that he saw no military justification for dropping it. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did, anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor.”
In his memoir, “I Was There,” Fleet Adm. William Leahy, the chief of staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, wrote: “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.”
Gen. Carl Spatz, head of U.S. Strategic Air Force operations in the Pacific, was the commanding officer charged with the delivery of the atom bombs.
In a 1964 interview, he offered an alternative to their use: “If we were to go ahead with the plans for a conventional invasion,” he said, “I believe the Japanese thought that they could inflict very heavy casualties on us and possibly get better surrender terms. On the other hand, if they were told that no invasion would take place (and) that (conventional) bombing would continue until the surrender, I think the surrender would have taken place at just about the same time.”
Gen. Holland M. Smith, commander of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, who had developed the techniques of amphibious assault used by the Army and Marines throughout World War II and who personally led the bloody assaults on Tarawa, Saipan and Iwo Jima, also believed the use of atomic weapons on the Japanese civilian population was unnecessary.
On his return to the U.S. from Iwo Jima in May 1945, he was quoted as saying that an invasion of the Japanese home islands would not be necessary. Japan was finished as a military power, he insisted, and it would be just a matter of blockading the home islands, cutting them off from their much-needed supplies, and, in effect, starving them out.
のちに大統領となったアイゼンハワー将軍は回顧録でこう語っている。「1945年7月、戦時長官のスティムゾン氏から日本への原爆投下について知らされた。私はそのような行為がおろかであるとする根拠があると考えた者のうちの一人だった。私は彼に対して、もう日本は敗北間近であることからまったく無駄であること、そのような兵器で米軍の命が救えるとは考えられないことだし、使用によって国際世論に衝撃を与えてはならないと考えていることを伝えた。日本政府は当時、最小限の「面子」を保つための降伏を探っていると私は考えていた。」また複数の情報から、ダグラス・マッカーサー元帥も投下に反対であったという。彼の側近を務めたノーマン・カズン氏によると、「マッカーサー氏は原爆投下に反対でした。原爆投下について彼に尋ねたところ、軍事的意味はないと言いました。米国が最初から皇室を温存することに同意していれば、戦争は数週間前に終わっていただろう、と」太平洋戦での空軍司令官であったカール・スパッツ将軍は、1964年のインタビューでこう語っている。「日本に対して通常の上陸作戦を展開するとしたら、日本側は抵抗して降伏を有利にしようとしただろう。しかし、上陸はしないが降伏まで通常爆撃を続けるとこちらが言ったら、同じくらいの時期に降伏していただろう」また、タラワ・サイパン・硫黄島で指揮を執ったホランド・スミス将軍も、一般市民への原爆投下は不必要と考えていた。1945年5月に硫黄島から帰国する際、日本の軍事力は終わっているから本島への上陸作戦はいらないと言い、その代わりに輸送路を断ち切って飢えさせればいいといったという。
つまり、1945年5〜7月には米軍の首脳部は、日本降伏は時間の問題と考えていたわけだ。それでも投下したんだ、2発も。まじないわー。それでも米軍がこれからもずーっといてくれないと困るんですかね？
